The Continuing Search for Proper Perspective:
Whose Reasonableness Should Be at Issue in a
Prescription Product Design Defect Analysis?"
Richard L. CuppJr.*
Whether a decision seems reasonable often depends on who is
analyzing it. Decisions often appear sensible to some but foolish to
others. Frequently, one's judgment depends on how expansively one
considers the factors leading to the decision in question. Decisions
that seem reasonable under a narrow analysis, for example, often
reveal flaws when considered with a broader view. Perspective is
central.
This Article focuses on identifying a proper perspective for
judging the reasonableness of design decisions related to prescription
products. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
(Restatement (Third)), adopted by the American Law Institute (ALI)
in 1997, judges prescription-product designs from the perspective of
prescribing health-care providers.! Section 6 of the Restatement
(Third) provides that a prescription-product manufacturer should be
liable for design defects only if reasonable health-care providers,
knowing of a drug's foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would
not prescribe the product to any class of patients.2
This Article compares the Restatement (Third)'s "reasonable
physician" standard3 to a standard judging the reasonableness of
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I SeeR .SrATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTs: PRODUCrS LLABILry § 6(c) (1997).
2 See id.
s See id. Although generally physicians will be in the position of making
prescription decisions, the Restatement (Third) utilizes the broader description of
"health-care providers." See id. This Article will use the phrase "reasonable physician
test" with the understanding that the Restatement (Third) may allow for cases
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prescription-product designs from the perspective of a reasonable
manufacturer of such products. Part I explores a potential design
defect problem involving a prescription drug to illustrate the
differences between a reasonable physician standard and a
reasonable manufacturer standard.
After introducing the issues with this illustration, the Article
focuses on two questions. Part II addresses whether the Restatement
(Third)'s reasonable physician standard restates existing law. The
Restatement (Third) is an admirable scholarly work, and most of it
will be well-received in the courts. Part II, however, contends that,
unlike other aspects of the Restatement (Third), its reasonable
physician standard for prescription product design defect claims is
inconsistent with existing case law. Although courts vary in their
approach to prescription-product design defects, most jurisdictions
The Restatement
utilize a reasonable manufacturer standard.
(Third)'s reasonable physician standard is a new creation, not
reflective of the law of any jurisdiction.
Part III addresses whether the new reasonable physician
standard is preferable to the reasonable manufacturer standard. In
most cases, following either of the two approaches will lead to the
Because of the unique policy concerns
same conclusion.
surrounding prescription products, neither standard will often allow
findings of liability. In relatively rare instances, however, these policy
concerns are weaker or inapplicable, and imposing design liability is
desirable. The Restatement (Third)'s reasonable physician standard
provides manufacturers almost complete immunity from design
liability and inappropriately blocks recovery in deserving cases. The
broader reasonable manufacturer standard provides greater
flexibility and allows for liability when appropriate. Liability is
particularly appropriate in cases involving prescription products with
cosmetic applications and in cases involving prescription medical
devices. Since cosmetic medical products and prescription medical
devices have multiplied rapidly in recent years and seem likely to
continue their expansion, the importance of allowing design liability
in deserving cases will increase over time.
I. PROSCAR VERSUS PROPECIA - A TEST CASE
Providing a somewhat involved illustration will assist in
highlighting some of the issues courts face in choosing between the
Restatement (Third)'s reasonable physician test and the broader
involving nonphysician prescribers.

1999]

A SEARCH FOR PROPERPERSPECTIVE

235

reasonable manufacturer test. Propecia is a prescription drug that
Merck Company began marketing in early 1998. 4 Most Americans
have heard of Propecia because Merck spent 13.9 million dollars
advertising it in the first ten months of 1998 alone. 5 Propecia is
prescribed solely to treat baldness.6
Since 1992, however, Merck has used finasteride, the active
ingredient in Propecia, in another drug label. This earlier label,
called "Proscar," is used to treat prostate enlargement.! Proscar is
essentially the same as Propecia, except that one milligram of
finasteride is used in a Propecia pill, whereas five milligrams of
finasteride are used in a Proscar pill.8 Proscar, like Propecia, prevents
baldness, but Proscar has more finasteride than is needed for that
purpose.9

A study published in the New EnglandJournal of Medicine in 1996
reported that 214 men taking Proscar for prostate enlargement
developed gynecomastia, an enlargement of the breasts. 0 Men who
develop gynecomastia are susceptible to breast cancer. 1 Proscar has
numerous other side effects, including insomnia, urinary tract
infections, and urogenital birth defects.12 Another 1996 study found
that Proscar is no more effective at treating prostate enlargement
than are placebos.13 The study also found that Hytrin, a competing
drug, was truly effective in the treatment of prostate enlargement.1

4 See Battle Grows over Drugs for HairLoss; Pharmacia& Upjohn,
Merck Squaring Off
in Marketing Race; Sales Said to Be Rising; Firms Seek to Enlarge Market: $1.5 billion, 7
million U.S. Men; Pharmaceuticals,BALT. SUN, Mar. 1, 1998, at ID [hereinafter Battle

Grows].
5

See Spending on Rx Drug Ads Reaches 1.1 Billion in First 10 Months
of 1998;

Surpasses 1997 Tota4 Bus. WIRE,Jan. 27, 1999, at 1.
6

SeeJacquelyn Mitchard, We'll Shave Our Legs If You Grow Some Hair, MILWAUKEE

J. SENTINEL,Jan. 25, 1998, at 1.

See id.; Merck ProscarPhase IV Commitments Led to Claimsfor Reduced Risk of Prostate
Surgery and Reduced Risk of Acute Urinary Retention, PHARMACEUTICALS APPROVALS
MONTHLY,June 1, 1989, available in 1998 WL 9724724.
8 See Battle Grows, supra note 4, at ID.
9 See id.
10 See ProscarCan CauseIll Effects, HEALTHFACTS, Nov. 1, 1996, available in
1996 WL
9129123.
1 See id.
1
See Patient Access to Unapproved Therapies and Treatments Before the House Gov't
Reform and Oversight Comm., 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Peter A. Defazio,
representative of Oregon) [hereinafter PatientAccess].
13 See Laura Beil, Drug Shows Promisefor Prostate
Patients, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Feb. 26, 1998, at 4A.
14 See Benign Prostate Cancer - Shedding Light
on the ProstateDilemma, HARV. HEALTH
7

LETrER, Jan. 1,1997.
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Yet another study reported that Saw Palmetto extract is more
15
effective, far safer, and cheaper than Proscar.
Despite these findings, doctors continue to prescribe Proscar for
prostate enlargement on a huge scale. According to congressional
16
testimony, sales of Proscar in 1998 exceeded one billion dollars.'
This phenomenon is not unusual in the medical industry. Doctors
often continue to prescribe drugs with which they are familiar, long
after studies have shown that safer and perhaps better drugs are
available. 7
Fortunately for those taking it, Propecia seems effective in
preventing baldness and appears to be not nearly as dangerous as
Proscar, even though the drugs contain the same active ingredient.
Apparently, the much lower dose of finasteride in Propecia makes it
much safer. 8 Even though it has one-fifth of the active ingredient,
however, Propecia costs much more than Proscar. Propecia costs
approximately fifty dollars per month, whereas Proscar costs only
Merck justifies the price
about fourteen dollars per month. 9
difference as resulting from independent research performed to
develop Propecia and from the hefty price of advertising Propecia
Given the significant price difference, many doctors prescribe
Many doctors are
Proscar to men seeking to prevent baldness.'
instructing patients to use pill-cutters to divide the Proscar pills into
five parts, so that each will provide as much finasteride as does a dose
of Propecia.n This off-label prescribing is reportedly legal, and, from
a financial perspective, it makes sense. 3 When taking one-fifth of a
cheaper Proscar pill per day, men are receiving an effective dose of
See PatientAccess, supra note 12.
See id.
1
See Teresa Moran Schwartz, Prescription-products and the Proposed Restatement
(Third), 61 TENN. L. REV. 1357, 1382 (1994). The inferior drug may continue to be
prescribed because statutorily a drug may only be removed from the market when
there is an "imminent hazard to the public health." Id.
18 See Battle Grows, supra note 4, at ID.
19 See Nancy Ann Jeffrey, Drugs: Drug Shuffle for Balding Men, A
Cheaper Pill for
ProstatesRecovers Pates,WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 1991, at B1.
20 See id.
2
See Jim Thornton, New Drug May Put Dent in Male Balding, DENVER PosT, Dec.
16, 1997, at 2D.
See id. Because doctors write the off-label prescriptions, one possible response
to concerns about using Proscar for hair loss is that these doctors, rather than
Off-label prescribing, however, is legal, quite
manufacturers, are to blame.
foreseeable to manufacturers, and, in many cases, helpful rather than harmful. Of
course, many cases involving poor design decisions do not involve off-label
prescribing.
23 See id.
15
16
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baldness-preventing finasteride for much less than the fifty dollars
per month needed to get the same result with Propecia. 4 Even if the
consumer takes the entire Proscar pill, or cuts it in half or into thirds
(which might be easier than cutting the pill into fifths), the consumer
still saves substantially compared to the cost of Propecia. 5
Assume, for purposes of discussion, that Proscar is not at all
effective in treating prostate enlargement, that it causes enlarged
breasts in men and causes breast cancer, and that cheap, safe, and
effective alternatives for treating prostate enlargement exist.2

6

Is it

desirable to adopt a rule that holds that, even assuming these awful
facts, Proscar is not defective because it can also be used fairly safely
to remedy a cosmetic problem

-

baldness -

even though a

reasonable alternative design containing the same active ingredient
exists to treat baldness in the lower-dose Propecia?
The Restatement (Third)'s reasonable physician standard might
lead to such a finding.27 The reasonable physician standard of the
Restatement (Third) is that a prescription product is defective only if
reasonable health-care providers, knowing of its foreseeable risks and
benefits, would not prescribe the product to any class of patients.

It

could be argued that physicians are acting reasonably in prescribing
the cheaper Proscar to the subclass planning to cut the pills to use
safely for baldness, even though Proscar's primary use, treating
prostate enlargement, would be unhelpful and unreasonably
dangerous. Thus, the Restatement (Third)'s approach might bar

The monthly cost of the $14 per month for Proscar, when divided into
fifths, is
approximately $2.80.
Under this course of conduct, the consumer would pay $14 per
month (full
pill), $7 per month (half pill), or $4.77 per month (1/3 pill), as opposed to $50 per
month for Propecia. See supranote 19 and accompanying text.
26 Although all of these propositions have been
alleged by critics of Proscar, this
Article does not assert that these propositions have been proved. Considering these
propositions as hypothetical is sufficient to illustrate differences between the
reasonable physician test and the reasonable manufacturer test.
27 When presented with this hypothetical, Professor Aaron Twerski,
one of the
Restatement (Third)'s Reporters, expressed the opinion that Proscar is defective in
design even under the Restatement (Third)'s approach. Because the drug could be
prescribed safely, effectively, and legally for purposes of treating baldness (with the
added bonus of significant financial savings), this conclusion is not certain. In any
event, even if one of the Reporters would read section 6 in this manner, it is not
apparent that courts reading section 6 would share his conclusion. Indeed, if courts
were to interpret section 6 in this manner, it might be to avoid the undesirable result
that a less laborious reading of the section might render.
Straightforward
24

application of the dominant reasonable manufacturer standard might prove
preferable to strained interpretation of the newly created reasonable physician test.
28

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODucrsLIABILrm § 6(c)
(1997).
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from recovery all of the men harmed by using Proscar for its primary,
health-related purpose. Finding just one reasonable use, even if that
use is ancillary and for purely cosmetic purposes, in effect immunizes
the manufacturer regardless of how much harm a drug inflicts
overall.
In terms of the numbers of cases it will affect, my disagreement
with the Reporters is relatively small. The Reporters are correct that
most prescription products should receive greater design protection
than do other products, and that findings of liability should be
relatively rare. For example, Professor Michael Green noted that even
an infamously harmful drug, such as thalidomide, might also provide
medical benefits2 Although the drug causes horrid birth defects
when taken by pregnant women, thalidomide may aid persons
suffering from leprosy and other ailments. 30 Because strong warnings
are available and the risk to pregnant women is well-known, and
assuming that the drug has strong utility in treating leprosy, a court
may well find that thalidomide is not defective under both the
reasonable physician test and the reasonable manufacturer test. If,
however, thalidomide's only utility were in treating baldness, the
Restatement (Third)'s reasonable physician test would still exempt
the drug manufacturer from liability, whereas the reasonable
manufacturer test would allow at least the possibility of finding the
design defective. Although I believe that liability is appropriate in
only a relatively few cases, the Restatement (Third)'s approach allows
for liability in almost no cases.
II. SEARCHING FOR PRECEDENT SUPPORTING THE REASONABLE
PHYSICIAN TEST

Cases Cited by the Restatement (Third)

A.

Whether the Restatement (Third) restates or conflicts with
existing law is, of course, an important question. Professor James A.
See Michael D. Green, PrescriptionDrugs, Alternative Designs, and the Restatement
(Third): PreliminaryReflections, 30 SETON HALLL. REv. 193, 212 (1999).
30 See id.
31 The Restatement (Third) could be misinterpreted, in section 6, comment
a, to
contend that its reasonable physician standard for design liability is "generally
recognized." Arguably, the Reporters are asserting only that allowing some form of
design liability generally is recognized. A casual reader, however, might assume that
the "generally recognized" exception to the no-liability rule "consistent with recent
trends in the case law" refers to the Restatement (Third)'s standard. The Reporters'
notes clarify that "some" jurisdictions have adopted "essentially" the same approach.
This Article contends that no jurisdictions have adopted the same approach or the
29
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Henderson, one of the Reporters for the Restatement (Third), has
written that an "emerging body of law" supports the approach 2 In
the draft that originally proposed the reasonable physician standard,
however, the Reporters cited only one case.3" Following criticism that
the standard conflicts with rather than restates existing law, the
Reporters added two additional cases that they contend support their
approach. 4 This Part briefly analyzes each of these three cases to
demonstrate that the reasonable physician standard does not reflect
the law of any of these jurisdictions.
Tobin v. Astra PharmaceuticalProducts, Inc. was, originally, the
only case the Reporters cited to support the reasonable physician
approach. The court in Tobin ruled that a prescription drug is
defective when a product manufacturer, aware of the drug's risks,
would not have marketed the drug. 6 The Tobin court held that
"[t]he question is whether the product creates 'such a risk' of an
accident of the general nature of the one in question that 'an
ordinarily prudent company engaged in the 37manufacture' of the
product 'would not have put it on the market.'
The Restatement (Third) argues that its reasonable physician
standard is "essentially" the same as the standard in Tobin and other
cases." Although Tobin's approach usually will reach the same result
as the reasonable physician standard, it is not the same thing,
essentially or otherwise.
First, Tobin does not discuss what a
essence of the approach. See RESTATEMENT

(THIRD) OF TORTS § 6 cmt. a (1997).
See James A. Henderson, Jr., PrescriptionDrug Design Liability Under the Proposed
Restatement (Third) of Torts: A Reporter's Perspective, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 471, 494
32

(1996).

33See

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:

PRODUCTS LIABILITY

§ 4 reporters' notes

PRODUCTS LLABILITY

§ 6 reporters' notes

(Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994).
34

See

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:

(1997).
s5 993 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1992) (applying Kentucky law).
s6 See id. at 536-37.
37 Id. at 537 (quoting Montgomery Elevator Co. v. McCullough,
676 S.W.2d 776,
780 (Ky. 1984)). In this quotation, Tobin sets forth the general standard under
Kentucky law for strict liability. See id. at 536. The trial court gave a jury instruction
based on this standard, and Tobin approved it. See id. at 540. The trial court also
gave the jury an instruction based on comment k, which Tobin approved. See id. The
court noted that "Kentucky has ruled that comment k shields manufacturers from
liability for 'highly useful and desirable products attended with a known but
reasonable risk."' Id. (quoting McMichael v. American Red Cross, 532 S.W.2d 7, 9
(Ky. 1975)). This does not detract from the reasonable manufacturer test because it
requires a broad analysis of whether the product is "highly useful" and "desirable"
and balances this against a "reasonable" risk.
s8 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:

(1997).

PRODUCTS LIABILITY

§ 6 reporters' notes

240

SETON HALL LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 30:233

reasonable physician would do. Instead, the case analyzes whether a
reasonable manufacturer would have marketed the drug as
designed. 39 Further, Tobin does not ask whether a reasonable
manufacturer would market its drug to any class of patients. Rather,
Tobin asks, in a relatively straightforward manner, the broader
question of whether a reasonable manufacturer would have marketed
the drug as manufactured. 40
In an article in the Rutgers Law Review, Professor Henderson
asserts that "it is clear from the opinion that the court was unready to
sacrifice - by labeling a drug defective - any class of patients for

whom it might be the drug of choice. 4 ' Tobin, however, does not
refer to classes of patients. Perhaps the closest Tobin comes to such a
reference is in its quotation of a jury instruction indicating that a
drug is not defective "if it cannot be made completely safe for all
users, but is nevertheless a useful and desirable product which is
This jury
accompanied by proper directions and warnings." 42
instruction is based on language from comment k to section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) that limits protection to "an apparently
useful and desirable product. 4 3 The court noted that a Kentucky
court supported comment k's shielding of manufacturers from
liability for "highly useful and desirable products attended with a
known but reasonable risk."" The Tobin court went on to state that if
it
ritodrine prolongs pregnancy to reduce infant mortality (which
product."45
desirable
and
useful
"highly
a
be
would
this
does not),
Thus, rather than holding that a drug is protected if its risks
outweigh its benefits for any use, Tobin acknowledged that Kentucky
simply follows comment k, giving protection when a product is highly
useful and desirable. Although the lower court's jury instruction
quoted in the opinion did not include the word "highly," the Sixth
Circuit identified the designation as part of the appropriate standard
under Kentucky law. A use that merely saves consumers some money
to treat a cosmetic problem like baldness is unlikely to fall into the
"highly" useful and desirable category contemplated by Kentucky law.
The difference between Tobin's reasonable manufacturer test
and the Restatement (Third)'s reasonable physician test is one of
39
40
41

42

See Tobin, 993 F.2d at 536-37.
See id.
Henderson, supra note 32, at 488.
Tobin, 993 F.2d at 540.

4

Id.

4

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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perspective. The reasonable physician test uses blinders to maintain
a narrow perspective; a prescription-product manufacturer is immune
from liability no matter how much harm its design causes, as long as
there is at least one class of persons for whom the design's benefits
even marginally outweigh its risks. The reasonable manufacturer test
utilizes a broader perspective and is flexible enough to recognize
that, even if there is a class of persons for whom the drug is
acceptable when taken as designed, the manufacturer still might be
unreasonable in marketing the drug if its social costs outweigh its
benefits. Professor Henderson acknowledged this difference between
Tobin and the Restatement (Third) standard, implying that Tobin
allows "netting out all risks and benefits globally," whereas the
Restatement (Third) focuses on reasonableness for any one class of
patients."
The illustration involving Propecia and Proscar helps
demonstrate how this difference in perspective between Tobin's
reasonable manufacturer test and the Restatement (Third)'s
reasonable physician test plays out. Under the reasonable physician
test, Proscar is immunized from liability because it can be used safely
to treat the cosmetic problem of baldness and is cheaper than the
lower dosage design.
Using the reasonable manufacturer test,
however, the court might hold that the manufacturer should not
have marketed the higher-dose Proscar at all. In reaching this
holding, the court would assume that Proscar is not effective in
treating prostate enlargement, is dangerous when used in high-dose
form, and, for the relatively unimportant use of treating baldness, is
replaceable with the safer design of a lower dosage. "Net[ting] out
all the risks and benefits globally"47 might lead to a rejection of

Proscar, whereas the Restatement (Third)'s search for benefits for
any class of patients might spare Proscar.
The second case cited by the Restatement (Third) is Williams v.
Ciba-Geigy Corp.4 8 As with Tobin, Williams makes no mention of the
reasonable physician standard or of classes of patients. Despite this,
the Restatement (Third) points out that the court showed respect for
the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) approval process, and
Henderson, supra note 32, at 487.
47

Id.

686 F. Supp. 573 (W.D. La.), affd, 864 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1988). The drug at
issue was Tegretol, which is designed for the control of epileptic symptoms,
including psychomotor and grand mal seizures and for relief of trigenminal
neuralgia (suddenly recurring or intensifying severe pain focused roughly in the
center of the head, below the brain). See Williams, 686 F. Supp. at 578. As a result,
the plaintiff developed a serious skin condition. See id. at 580.
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that the court required the plaintiff to provide evidence of "an
articulable basis for disregarding the FDA's determination that the
drug should be available."4 9

The Restatement (Third) then quotes

the court's finding that Tegretol, the drug at issue, has high utility
and was the only drug available to treat the plaintiff's disorder.0
In fact, Williams supports the reasonable manufacturer test
rather than the reasonable physician test. Courts frequently consider
the FDA approval process as some evidence of reasonableness that
the plaintiff must overcome. 5 Further, it is highly relevant under the
reasonable manufacturer test that Tegretol has significant social
utility and that it is the only drug available to treat a serious problem.
This does not mean, however, that Williams immunizes drug
manufacturers from liability if there was just some use, no matter how
trivial, for which a design's utility outweighs its risks. Rather, Williams
engages in the kind of global balancing of risks and utilities that the
Restatement (Third) is seeking to avoid.
Williams' broad perspective on analyzing a manufacturer's
reasonableness is apparent in the decision:
Proper "risk" evidence for purposes of the risk-utility test is not a
mere roster of isolated incidents. Rather, "risk" in a vaccine or
pharmaceutical case, as with other cases, concerns not only the
qualitative harmful effect, but also the quantitative harm or
"incidence" of serious adverse effects, that is, the ratio of instances
of harm compared to the total use or consumption of the
product. Although the danger may be devastating to those
individuals who experience the worst effects, the incidence may
be statistically small and the5 composite risk may not outweigh the
value of a high utility drug. 2
Under the approach in Williams, a drug that is the only
medication available for a serious condition would not be defective
unless it caused even more serious harm. This is appropriate. Using
its global perspective, however, Williams would likely condemn a drug
design that presents serious risks of harm to most users, but provides
a reasonable alternative to treating a medically insignificant problem,
such as baldness, for one class of users. On the whole, marketing
such a drug is not reasonable.

49

See

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF

TORTS:

PRODUCTS LiABIuT

(citing Williams, 686 F. Supp. at 577.
50 See id. (citing Williams, 686 F.
Supp. at 578).
51 See Schwartz, supra note 17, at 1377.
52 Williams, 686 F. Supp. at 578-79 (citations omitted).

§ 6 cmt. f (1997)
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The Restatement (Third) cites only one more case, for a total of
three, in an effort to support its reasonable physician approach.
However, this case, Ortho PharmaceuticalCorp. v. Heath," is not any
more helpful than are Tobin and Williams. As with Tobin and Williams,
Ortho does not mention reasonable physicians or classes of patients.
Ortho is somewhat similar to the Proscar/Propecia illustration
provided above in that the case involves higher versus lower dosages
of an active ingredient as design alternatives. The plaintiff's doctor
prescribed a relatively low-dose estrogen birth control pill, but the
plaintiff experienced excessive bleeding associated with menstrual
flow while taking the pill.54 The plaintiffs doctor switched the
prescription to a higher-dose estrogen pill to alleviate this problem. 55
However, the plaintiff allegedly developed kidney failure and other
problems as a result of taking the higher-dose pill, and she claimed
that making the higher-dose pill constituted a design defect.6
As with Williams, the Restatement (Third) relies on Ortho's
notation that the challenged design was the only one available to
treat the plaintiff's serious medical problem - the lower-dosage
alternative would not stop her bleeding.
However, this is quite
different from finding the drug immune from design liability when
its utility even marginally outweighs its risks for one class of users,
regardless of the importance of the use. The Restatement (Third)'s
reasonable physician test immunizes manufacturers not only in
situations in which the drug at issue is the only one available, but also
in situations in which the drug is one of several reasonable options
for a small class of patients, but potentially deadly and unhelpful to
most users. As shown in the passage below, Ortho follows a global,
broad-perspective approach to determine whether the utilities in a
drug's design outweigh its risks:
[There are] four factors to be considered in determining whether
a manufacturer is entitled to a defense based on comment k: the
product's utility must greatly outweigh the risk created by its use;
the risk must be a known one; the product's benefits must not be
achievable in another manner; and the risk must be unavoidable
under the present state of knowledge.5

722 P.2d 410 (Colo. 1986).
See id. at 411.
55 See id.
56Seeid.
at 411-12.
5s

54

57 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
8

OFTORTS: PRODUCTS LABILITy§ 6 cmt. f (1997).
Ortho Pharm. Corp., 722 P.2d at 415.
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Cases Decided Since the ALT's Adoption of the ReasonablePhysician
Test

B.

At least two cases have addressed the reasonable physician
standard since the ALI adopted the Restatement (Third). Sita v.
Danek Medical, Inc." presented a fact pattern in which, given the
court's findings, design liability is inappropriate under either the
reasonable manufacturer standard or the reasonable physician
standard. In Sita, the plaintiffs asserted, among other things, that a
manufacturer defectively designed a surgical screw system. 60 The
defendants, however, presented "an impressive compendium" of 270
surgeons' testimony that
S 61 use of the medical device as designed was
helpful and appropriate.

In ruling on the strict liability design defect claim, the court did
not rely on a special standard for prescription products. Rather, the
court applied a simple risk-utility balancing test generally applicable
to strict liability design defect claims.6 The court pointed out that
the plaintiffs failed to present evidence that the screw systems were
unsafe, and also that the plaintiffs failed to present evidence of a
reasonable alternative design. 6 Thus, the court dismissed the claim.
It noted in dicta that the plaintiffs' claims also would fail under the
Restatement (Third)'s proposed reasonable physician test. In a
footnote, the court indicated that reasonable health-care providers
would prescribe the screw systems because use of the systems is the
industry standard of care. Thus, the screw systems would not be
defective even if the Restatement (Third)'s test were applied.6 The
court also pointed out that use of the surgical screws was the only
viable option for patients who previously had undergone spinal
surgery. 5 The court noted that this would be another ground for
denying liability under the Restatement (Third) view. 6
Although Sita did not criticize the reasonable physician test, the
court was not presented a situation in which it needed to choose

60
61

43 F. Supp.2d 245 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
See id. at 255.
See id. at 255-56.

See id. at 255. The court clearly articulated the applicable standard when it
stated, "More precisely, the standard is whether, 'if the design defect were known at
the time of manufacture, a reasonable person would conclude that the utility of the
62

product did not outweigh the risk inherent in marketing a product designed in that

manner.'" Id. (internal citations omitted).
6
See id. at 257.
6
See id. at 256 n.9.
See Sita, 43 F. Supp.2d at 258.
6

See id.
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between the reasonable physician test and the, reasonable
manufacturer test. The plaintiffs failed to present any solid evidence
that the product was problematic. Thus, the court understandably
saw no need to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the newly
proposed reasonable physician test. Given its view of the evidence
(or lack of plaintiff's evidence) the court would have easily rejected
liability under either approach.
The second case, Taylor v. Danek Medical, Inc.,67 involved a
surgical screw system that was the same as or similar to the system at
issue in Sita."' In its analysis, the Taylor court differentiated between
strict liability and negligence in design defect claims. The court first
predicted that Pennsylvania courts would not apply strict products
liability to prescription medical devices, and it rejected the plaintiffs'
strict liability claim on that basis.69 The court also predicted that
Pennsylvania courts would approve of the reasonable physician test
for strict liability claims.70 Thus, the court cited the plaintiffs' failure
to establish that reasonable health-care providers would not prescribe
the screw system to any class of patients as an additional basis for
granting summary judgment on the strict liability design defect cause
of action.
Although reading only Taylors strict liability analysis would give
a sense of support for the reasonable physician test, ultimately the
court undermined the Reporters' intended use of the test. Instead,
the court firmly supported the reasonable manufacturer approach.
In analyzing the plaintiffs' claim of negligent design defect (which
was pleaded in addition to strict liability design defect), the court
declined to apply, or even to discuss, the Restatement (Third) and its
reasonable physician test. Rather, the court set forth the negligence
standard for design defects as a straightforward reasonable prudent
person approach.7 Contrasting sharply with its strict liability analysis,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20265 (E.D.Pa., Dec. 29, 1998).
See id. at *4. Taylor described the product, which the court called a Cotrel
Dubosset device, as consisting of "screws, hooks, rods, transverse traction devices,
connectors, and other components that allow surgeons to customize constructs." Id.
Sita used the same language to describe the product before the court, but called it
"the Texas Scottish Rite Hospital Spinal System." Sita, 43 F. Supp.2d at 249.
See Taylor, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *21-*22. The court noted that Pennsylvania
courts disallow strict liability for prescription drugs, and the court predicted that the
Pennsylvania courts would extend this rule to prescription medical devices. See id.
67
68

70

See id. at *22-*23.

71 See

id. at *31-*32 ("Negligence is the doing of some act which a reasonably
prudent person would not do, or the failure to do something which a reasonable
prudent person would do. It is the failure to use the ordinary care a reasonably
prudent person would use under the same or similar circumstances.").
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the court found that the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence of
unreasonableness in the manufacturer's design to survive a summary
judgment motion.n
Taylor's approach is plainly not what the Reporters had in mind
when they created the reasonable physician test. Indeed, the
Reporters' notes to comment f of section 6 expressly reject reserving
the reasonable physician test for strict liability only and allowing a
different standard under negligence. 7 Rather, the Restatement
(Third) insists that its test be used in both negligence and strict
liability claims.7
By paying lip service, with little analysis, to the
reasonable physician test in its strict liability discussion, but applying
the reasonable manufacturer test under negligence, Taylor in effect
rejects the Restatement (Third)'s attempt to severely limit
prescription product design liability.
Taylor's approach allows
plaintiffs to avoid whatever difficulties the reasonable physician test
might present and to instead utilize the reasonable manufacturer test
by merely pleading a negligence cause of action.
C. Scholars'Analysisof the Case Law
Since the Reporters first proposed their reasonable physician
test, numerous law review articles have analyzed how the approach
compares to existing case law. As acknowledged in the Reporters'
notes to the Restatement (Third), at least two jurisdictions recently
have gone to the opposite extreme of the near immunity provided by
Restatement (Third)'s approach. These jurisdictions apply strict
liability in prescription drug design cases with no protection for
manufacturers at all.75 Most jurisdictions addressing the issue,

7

See id. at *35.

73 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:

PRODUCTS LIABILITY

§

6 cmt. f reporters'

notes (1997). The Restatement (Third) suggests:
It should be noted that some cases exempt drugs and medical devices
from design review based on a strict liability theory only. They appear
to allow plaintiffs to pursue a cause of action for negligence. The rule
set forth in section 6(c) would provide the exclusive basis for a cause of
action based on objective drug design. As with section 2, the test in
section 6 is stated in functional terms. Thus, whether the case is
brought under negligence or strict liability a plaintiff would be
successful only if it could make out the elements set forth in section

6(c).
Id.
74

See id.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 cmt. f (1997); see
also Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1193-94 (Alaska 1992); Allison v. Merck &
Co., 878 P.2d 948, 954 (Nev. 1994).
75
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however, have taken a middle-ground approach. Recognizing the
need to give some protection to drug manufacturers, but also the
need for some accountability, these jurisdictions have adopted some
form of a broad perspective reasonable manufacturer test.
The legal literature overwhelmingly recognizes that the
Restatement (Third)'s approach does not restate the dominant
approach courts take in cases involving prescription-product designs.
Not all, but most of the commentators are critical of the Restatement
(Third)'s departure from the case law. A brief review of some of the
commentary provided by these articles is helpful in providing a sense
of how the reasonable physician test is being received in the first few
years since its birth.76
One of the first articles addressing the reasonable physician test
was published in 1994 and authored by Professor Teresa Moran
Schwartz." Professor Schwartz has extensive experience with food
and drug regulation issues both in academia and in government
service, and her article published in the Tennessee Law Review was
critical of the Restatement (Third)'s approach to prescription
product design defects:
With respect to design standards, this Article finds that [the
Restatement (Third)'s prescription product design defect test]
departs significantly from common-law rulings by establishing a
.super" negligence standard of liability. It raises concerns that
the proposed standard will be difficult to apply as drafted, and will
create such a narrow band of liability that it would effectively
eliminate a cause of action for defective design.' a
In the same year, I published an article in the George Washington
Law Review that also disapproved of the reasonable physician
approach and expressed doubt about its foundation in case law." At
that time, the Restatement (Third) draft cited only one case, Tobin v.
Astra Pharmaceutical Products, Inc., ° to support the reasonable
physician standard. My article notes:
76

I have omitted excerpts from law review articles written by the Reporters

addressing the issue because their views on the case law are provided in the
Restatement (Third). For the most detailed of the Reporters' law review articles
setting forth their views, see generally Henderson, Jr., supra note 32. The article's
analysis of relevant cases is, for the most part, repeated in the Restatement (Third)'s
reporters' notes.
7 See generally Schwartz, supra note
17.
78 Id. at 1364.
See generally Richard L. Cupp Jr., Rethinking Conscious Design Liability for
Prescription Drugs: The Restatement (Third) Standard Versus a Negligence Approach, 63
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 76 (1994).

90 993 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1993).
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If nothing else, wide judicial acceptance of the new Restatement's
approach would clarify the unavoidably unsafe products doctrine.
However, it seems unlikely that courts will uniformly adopt the
new Restatement's version of the doctrine. Unlike many of the
ALI's revisions to section 402A, its language addressing
prescription products is far from a restatement of present law.
Indeed . . . the new Restatement claims only one jurisdiction as

presently utilizing its approach to conscious design defect actions,
and even that claim is questionable."'
A 1995 student Note that appeared in the Syracuse Law Review
provides what may be the most supportive analysis of the reasonable

physician test.82 The author contends that the Restatement (Third)
captures the spirit of Tobin and provides some much-needed
clarification:
[T] he tentative draft of the Restatement of the Law (Third) Torts
basically codifies what the court was emphasizing in Tobin. If a
plaintiff can show that the reasonably foreseeable risks posed by a
drug are so great that a reasonable health-care provider, who is
informed of the risks, would not prescribe the drug to any patient
then the design is defective and the plaintiff is entitled to recovery
from the manufacturer. Similarly, the court in Tobin articulates
that if an ordinarily prudent manufacturer of a product (such as a
prescription drug) is aware of the risks and would not market the
product, then the product is defectively designed and the plaintiff
is entitled to recovery. The advantage of [the Restatement
83
(Third) 's approach] is it is more clear than the ruling in Tobin.

The next year, Professor Jerry Phillips added to the articles
critical of the Restatement (Third)'s standard and its foundation in
the case law.84 In his article in the Chicago-Kent Law Review, Professor
Phillips expresses special concern about over-reliance on the
existence of learned intermediaries and the FDA approval process to
justify using a restrictive approach:
The Reporters' Notes . . .recognize that "in recent years many
courts have imposed limitedjudicial review [of the reasonableness
of design] on this special category of products," but they choose
to disregard this developing trend. The rationale given is that
[the Restatement's approach] "shows appropriate deference to
CI
Gupp, supranote 79, at 98 (citations omitted).
82

See Andrew Barrett, Note, The Past and Future of Comment k: Section (4)(B)(4) of

the Tentative Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts - Is It the Beginning of a New Era for

PrescriptionDrugs?, 45 SYRA UsE L. REv. 1291, 1324 (1995).
83 Id.

SeeJerry J. Phillips, The Unreasonably Unsafe Product and Strict Liability, 72
KENT L. REv. 129, 130 (1996).
84

CHI.-
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the regulated market, where the FDA and learned intermediaries
select which drugs should be available." This rationale gives
much greater credence to safety regulatory effect provided by the
FDA and learned intermediaries than many persons would be
willing to give, and shows much more reliances5 on those entities
than isjustified by existing and developing law.
A student Comment also published in 1996 in the Emory Law
Journal provides what may be the harshest assessment of the
Restatement (Third)'s approach, serving up a laundry list of
criticisms:
Such an overbearing standard is wholly unsupported by case law
and is problematic as a substantive rule of law. The broad
standard imposed by this section completely immunizes
pharmaceutical manufacturers from claims brought under a
design defect theory. As such, this standard is likely to prove
unworkable. [C]onsumers injured by prescription drugs or
medical devices should be able, at the very least, to sue a
manufacturer in negligence.
The [Restatement (Third)'s
standard] prohibits a negligence action unless the plaintiff can
show that no reasonable doctor would prescribe the drug. This
effectively poses an insurmountable burden on consumers and is
wholly unsupported by case law. For a new prescription drug
standard to be workable, it must provide a measure of protection
to both manufacturers and consumers.
Some believe a
negligence standard would serve this purpose. This Comment
strongly encourages the ALI to afford consumers more
protection.86
In a 1997 article published in the University of MichiganJournalof
Legal Reform, Professor Frank Vandall also opines that the reasonable
physician approach is lacking in precedent and will be rejected by the
courts:
Instead [of looking at precedent the Reporters] take a clean sheet
of paper and virtually grant immunity to all drug and medical
device manufacturers for defective design cases. Because of these
omissions [the Restatement (Third) standard] is void of
precedent. Most likely, courts will not accept [the Restatement
(Third)'s prescription product design section] until the Reporters
evaluate the cases and the policies and draft a proposal that
reflects the law. 7
Id. at 155 (citations omitted).
Angela C. Rushton, Comment, Design Defects Under the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: A Reassessment of Strict Liability and the Goals of a FunctionalApproach, 45 EMORY
L.J. 389, 419, 435-36 (1996) (citations omitted).
87 Frank J. Vandall, Constructing a Roof Before the Foundation Is Prepared: The
85
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1997 also produced an article by Kelley E. Cash in the Review of
Litigation analyzing how the Restatement (Third) will affect possible
litigation related to AIDS vaccines.88 Cash supports limiting liability
to encourage development of an effective AIDS vaccine but worries
that the reasonable physician standard so "radically" differs from
existing law that courts will reject it:
(The Restatement (Third)'s section addressing liability for
prescription products], unlike its predecessor, comment k, is not
ambiguous in its goal to provide prescription drug manufacturers
protection from design defect claims.
Unfortunately, it so
radically departs from the approach of many courts and some
state statutes that it is unlikely to gain uniform adoption. 9
One of the most detailed and thoughtful analyses of the
Restatement (Third)'s standard is provided in a 1997 student Note
published in the Cornell Law Review. 9°
The author generally
applauded the Reporters' goal of clarifying and limiting prescription
product design liability, but he criticized use of the reasonable
physician approach:
One of the main functions of a Restatement is to survey the law that is, to sift through the case law and statutes in order to

assemble a body of work that at once explains the law and guides
future lawmaking activities. A search of the case law indicates that
no prescription drug or device design defect case refers to the
"reasonable physician" or to the "reasonable health-care
provider."

In Tobin v. Astra PharmaceuticalProducts Inc., the only

case relied upon by the co-reporters of the Restatement (Third)
in support of [their approach], the court focused on the "prudent
manufacturer." By asking the courts to accept this new test, the
co-reporters invite criticism and potential rejection. Judges in
jurisdictions whose case law has developed along the . . . risk-

benefit approach to pharmaceuticals could well dismiss [the
Restatement (Third)'s standard] out of hand as being
unsubstantiated, because no court has ever employed a
"reasonable health-care provider" approach for drug design
liability claims. 9'

Restatement (Third) of Torts: ProductsLiability Section 2(b) Design Defect, 30 U. MIcH. J.L.
REFORM 261, 270 (1997) (citations omitted).
8 See Kelley E. Cash, Note, The New Restatement (Third) of Torts: Is It the Cure
for the
AIDS Vaccine Ailment?, 16 REV. LITIG. 413, 428-37 (1997).
89 Id. at 437-38.
90 See generally Jeffrey D. Winchester, Note, Section 8(c) of the Proposed Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Is It Really What the Doctor Ordered , 82 CORNELL L. REv. 644 (1997).
91 Id. at 671-72.
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One of the more recent articles addressing the reasonable
physician test was published in 1998 in the Food & Drug Law Journal
and authored by Michael J. Wagner and Laura L. Peterson. 2 Wagner
and Peterson point out that the lack of precedent supporting the
reasonable physician test may lead to its rejection, and they argue
that a reasonable manufacturer approach is preferable:
The key element of the test articulated by this provision is the
"reasonable health-care provider" standard.
This proposed
standard was created by the reporters without apparent precedent
in case law. The Sixth Circuit's opinion in Tobin v. Astra
PharmaceuticalProducts, Inc., cited in the reporters' note[s] ....

comes closest to articulating a test similar to that found in [the
Restatement (Third)]. In this case, the court applied Kentucky
law and held that a defective design claim could succeed if the
jury found that a product manufacturer who was aware of the
risks associated with a drug would not have marketed it. This
"reasonable manufacturer" standard, however, is a better test than
the one provided in the new Restatement, because the actions
and judgment of doctors should not be determinative of the
reasonableness of a given drug or medical device. Moreover,
because
physicians largely rely on the manufacturers'
representations about the products they market, having the
physician set the standard of whether a product should be on the
market would be nonsensical.
Such problems increase the
potential for rejection of the Restatement (Third) by the

judiciary.93
Finally, a 1998 student Comment that appeared in the Ohio State
Law Review summarily dismisses any notion that the reasonable
physician test restates existing law:
The ALI has taken a "clean slate" approach to the problem of
pharmaceutical design defect liability. The design defect liability
section of the proposed Restatement, however, is not a
"restatement" of the current law practiced in mostjurisdictions.9 4
This review of legal literature addressing the Restatement
(Third)'s reasonable physician test reveals the paucity of support for
the standard and the near-unanimous conclusion that it does not
restate existing case law. Although failing to follow the courts is not

See generally MichaelJ. Wagner & Laura L. Peterson, The New Restatement (Third)
of Torts - Shelterfrom the ProductLiability Storm for PharmaceuticalCompanies and Medical
Device Manufacturers , 53 FoOD& DRUG L.J. 225 (1998).
92

93 Id. at 233 (citations omitted).

94 David S. Torborg, Comment, Design Defect Liability and PrescriptionDrugs:
Who's
in Charge?. 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 633, 644 (1998).
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necessarily fatal to a Restatement's prospects for influencing future
cases, the initial academic reviews of the reasonable physician test do
not bode well for its widespread adoption.
III. EVALUATING THE REASONABLE PHYsICIAN TEST

Establishing that the Restatement (Third) approach fails to
restate existing law does not settle the issue of whether it is better or
worse than the dominant reasonable manufacturer standard.
Sometimes the ALI's Restatements lead, rather than follow, the
courts. For example, the strict liability standard adopted by section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts certainly did not restate
the dominant approach to products liability at the time. Within a few
years, however, most courts followed the ALI's standard.
Unfortunately, the Restatement (Third)'s departure from the
case law is. not an improvement. From several perspectives, the
existing reasonable manufacturer test seems preferable to the
reasonable physician test. Part III of this Article expands upon
concerns with the reasonable physician test illustrated in Part I's
comparison of Proscar and Propecia.
A.

Artificiality and Complexity

First, the Restatement (Third)'s reasonable physician standard is
artificial and is difficult to apply. It asks fact finders to presume that
physicians know all that the manufacturer knows about a drug and
then determine what physicians' reasonableness analysis would be,
given this knowledge, for any class of patients. 95 In reality, of course,
physicians do not know nearly as much as manufacturers know about
drug safety and efficacy.96 The artificiality and complexity of the
to create confusion for
Restatement (Third)'s standard is bound
97
jurors and may lead to erratic results.
B. ProtectingPrescriptionProducts of Unequal Utility Equally
A greater concern with the reasonable physician test, however, is
its narrowness and lack of flexibility. Not all prescription product
designs are created equal, and not all uses of prescription product
designs are created equal. The Restatement (Third), however, treats

See Schwartz, supra note 17, at 1381-82; Winchester, supranote 90, at,674-77.
% See Winchester, supra note 90, at 674-77.

95

97 See id. at 678.
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these designs equally, providing design immunity for any use of a
drug that is even marginally reasonable for any class of patients."
Because most drugs uniquely provide important health benefits
to some classes of patients without unduly harming others, findings
of defectiveness should be rare under both the reasonable physician
test and the reasonable manufacturer test. However, there are some
drugs that are only slightly helpful to a small class of users, or even
slightly helpful to a large class of users, but create a great deal of
harm overall. There are also drugs that are helpful only for a
relatively unimportant use, but create significant harm overall.
Courts need to have enough flexibility to treat these types of drugs
differently.
Allowing design liability is especially likely to be appropriate in
cases involving prescription products with cosmetic uses. A drug
designed to treat wrinkles should not have the same level of
protection given to heart medication. Often, drugs used for cosmetic
purposes also have health-related uses, such as the finasteride found
in Proscar and Propecia. 99 If the cosmetic use is acceptable, but the
health-related use is disastrous, immunizing the manufacturer may be
inappropriate. Given that the number of prescription products with
cosmetic applications has multiplied rapidly in recent years and
seems likely to continue to grow, this concern will likely become even
more significant over time. 0 °
Itmay be argued that, provided adequate warnings are given,
consumer autonomy should be afforded special respect regarding
products with cosmetic utility. Under this argument, consumers
should have the freedom to purchase cosmetic products with
potentially defective designs without the added cost or potential
unavailability that would result from allowing design defect lawsuits.'0 '
In considering this argument, it first should be noted that,
presently, courts do not typically excuse design defects simply
because adequate warnings are given. 02 The Restatement (Third)'s
6(c) (1997).
See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text.
100See generally Richard L. Cupp Jr., Sharing Accountabilityfor Breast Implants: Strict
98 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODUCrS LIABITY §

Products Liability and Medical Professionals Engaged in Hybrid Sales/Service Cosmetic

Products Transactions,21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 873 (1994).
101Professor Aaron Twerski suggested this as a potential argument during the
February 12, 1999 symposium at the Seton Hall University School of Law, entitled
ProvingProductDefect After the Third Restatement of Torts: Products Liability.
102
See, e.g., Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 44 (Alaska 1979) (concluding
that warnings of hidden dangers do not preclude design defect claims); Uloth v. City
Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188, 1192 (Mass. 1978) (declining to "adopt any rule which
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Reporters acknowledge in a law review article: "If a sensible design
alternative can significantly reduce risk, the law will demand that the
design out the risk rather than merely warn against
manufacturer
,
3
it. ,1

One could argue that products with cosmetic uses should be
excepted from this general rule because, generally, cosmetic products
are used only by the purchaser and do not have the potential to harm
third persons. In contrast, a defectively designed automobile places
at risk third persons beyond the purchaser warned of the danger.
Passengers in the purchaser's vehicle, other motorists, and
pedestrians also may be at risk. A defectively designed baldness
medication, however, is likely to injure only the purchaser. It could
be asserted that if the purchaser of such a medication is warned of its
dangers, he should be permitted to decide whether to encounter it
without the extra cost - or potential removal from the market that could result from a finding of design liability in lawsuits brought
by injured purchasers.
Courts have not made this kind of differentiation for design
defects in products with cosmetic utility, and courts should not.
Although promoting autonomy and individual responsibility is
laudable, focusing only on consumers' choices and not at all on
manufacturers' design choices in cases involving nonessential
products, such as cosmetics, is unbalanced and inappropriate.
Baldness medication, for example, does not have an especially
important utility that warrants exempting it from the general rules of
design liability applied to nonprescription products. Certainly a
person losing his hair may consider baldness medication extremely
important. Courts should consider consumers' willingness to accept
the risks as an important factor in deciding whether the baldness
medication is defectively designed. However, owning a fast all-terrain
vehicle (ATV) may be equally important to someone else. Although
courts consider consumers' desire to buy fast ATVs as an important
factor in deciding whether they are defectively designed, courts do
not rule out the possibility of design liability on that basis. Neither
the baldness medication nor the fast ATVs provide uses falling within

permits a manufacturer or designer to discharge its total responsibility to workers by
simply warning of the dangers of a product"); see alsoJerryJ. Phillips, The Standardfor
Determining Defectiveness in Products Liability, 46 U. CIN. L. REv. 101, 106 (1977)
(noting that "[t]here may be instances where the product is so dangerous that the
courts will find that the seller's obligation cannot be fulfilled merely by warning").
103 James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski,
A Proposed Revision of Section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1512, 1538 (1992).

1999]

A SEARCH FOR PROPERPERSPECTIVE

the broadly accepted rationale that prescription health products
need special protection because they have special utility.
No
persuasive reason is apparent for singling out cosmetic medical
products as more deserving of protection than are other products
that individual consumers may value highly.
As mentioned above, an argument may be made that
prescription products, even those with cosmetic utility, should be
treated differently because they are unique in generally harming only
the purchaser. This position, however, does not withstand close
analysis. First, examples of prescription products that harm third
persons, while not the norm, are not difficult to find. A prominent
example is the drug Diethylstilbestrol (DES), which has been the
subject of much products liability litigation. DES was prescribed to
pregnant women as an antimiscarriage drug.'0 DES harmed the
children of purchasing consumers, not the purchasers.' 5 As a
general rule, parents likely choose prescription products, including
those with cosmetic utility, for their children, rather than allowing
their children to choose the product for themselves. Although the
parent/child
relationship
is
much
different
than
a
consumer/bystander relationship (or, more accurately, lack of
relationship), the parent/child relationship is still a step removed
from an autonomous choice by the child injured by a defect.
Lawsuits asserting that Prozac and other prescription
antidepressants cause some users to become violent and harm third
persons also readily come to mind.' 6 For example, in April 1999,
when Eric Harris participated in killing thirteen of his classmates at
Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado, concerns were raised
that the antidepressant Harris was taking may have contributed to his
violence. 0 7 Although the substantive merit of such claims is
questionable, such claims provide another prominent illustration of
the potential for prescription products to cause harm to bystanders
who did not choose to encounter the drugs.
Further, prescription products with cosmetic utility are not the
only products that usually harm the purchaser alone. For example,
dangerous nonprescription products for intimate bodily use, such as
See Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924, 925 (Cal. 1980).
See id. at 925.
10
See, e.g., Carla Crowder, Rage Fuelled by Antidepressants?: Psychologists Dispute
Beliefs Medication Was Connected to Murderous Events, DENVER ROcKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,
Ma 30, 1999, at 60A.
104
105

See, e.g., Rick Montgomery, Concerns Arise over Teen's Medicine, KANSAS CITY STAR,

Apr. 30, 1999, at A15.
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hair products or pain medications sold over the counter, are also
typically likely to harm only the purchaser or a family member. Such
products, however, do not receive special protection from design
liability if an adequate warning is given.
Finally, imagine that the purchaser of a three-wheeled ATV is
injured when the vehicle rolls over. No bystanders are injured.
Suppose that the ATV is designed in a manner in which rolling over
is far too easy, and remedying the design problem is inexpensive and
does not remove too much utility. Assume, however, that an
adequate warning is provided. Courts looking at analogous facts
would not hold that a design defect claim is necessarily precluded
because only the purchaser is harmed (rather than a passenger or
bystander), and the purchaser is adequately warned. Thus, the idea
of using this reasoning in cases involving prescription products with
cosmetic utility would introduce a basis for denying recovery that
courts could, but choose not to, utilize presently under appropriate
Courts' failure to adopt such
facts with almost all products.
reasoning in cases in which only the purchaser is injured by a
defective design makes it doubtful that courts would be attracted to
using it in cases involving prescription products with cosmetic utility.
C. IncludingBlanket Protectionfor PrescriptionMedical Devices
Providing prescription medical devices the same near-immunity
given to drugs under the reasonable physician standard is an
especially troubling aspect of the Restatement (Third)'s approach.
Unlike some drugs, manufacturers are capable of making medical
devices with a broad universe of design alternatives. Thus, defective
designs may be more common in devices than in drugs. Further,
medical devices are not subject to the same level of FDA scrutiny as
are drugs.1 0 Even with regard to drugs, the FDA's resources are
stretched too thin to provide assurance that only safe drugs are
approved and remain on the market.' 9 For medical devices, with
even less FDA scrutiny, design problems are likely be much more
common. As with cosmetic drugs, we are likely to see many more
prescription devices on the market as time progresses.
D. Relying on Warnings Liability Alone to Protect Consumers
Part of the Reporters' argument for their reasonable physician
test seems to be that severely limiting design liability is not so bad
108 See Schwartz, supra note 17, at 1391-95.
10
See id. at 1387-91.
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because warnings claims are still available. However, courts have not
treated the existence of a warning claim, or even the existence of an
adequate warning, as a reason to bar design claims."' Further, some
fact patterns simply fit a design claim better than a warning claim,
even if a warning claim is theoretically available. Think again of the
Proscar/Propecia illustration.
How should the manufacturer's
warning for Proscar read? Something like "Do not use except for
treating baldness, and be sure you take only one-fifth of a pill?"
Given that the obvious alternative design of a lower-dose pill exists,
design defect is a much better fit. Further, as Professor Twerski notes
in a 1997 article in the PepperdineLaw Review, tort reform has seriously
compromised the doctrine of joint and several liability. The added
option of a design defect cause of action may help plaintiffs recover a
larger percentage of their damages from manufacturers than would
merely the option of a warning claim."'
IV. CONCLUSION

The broad perspective of the reasonable manufacturer test is
needed to provide at least some tort accountability for defective
prescription-product designs. Again, when seeking to structure some
well-deserved protection for extremely useful drugs, courts should
note that prescription products are not all created equal, and that
uses of prescription products are not all created equal.

:

See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
I See Aaron D. Twerski, Inside the Restatement, 24 PEPP. L. REv. 839, 855 (1997).
Professor Twerski stated:
Furthermore, in a world in which the common-law doctrine of joint
and several liability has been seriously compromised by both legislative
and judicial reform, fault allocation and ultimate recovery may vary
greatly depending on whether the cause of action against the drug
manufacturer is based on failure to warn, defective design, or both. As
between a physician who has committed malpractice in prescribing a
drug and a drug manufacturer who has been found liable for
manufacturing a defective drug, the fault allocation may be weighted
more heavily against a drug manufacturer if, in addition to inadequate
warning, a drug is found to be defectively designed.

